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NOTES
Antitrust and Labor

-

Union Liability

Under The Sherman Act
I.

THE BOUNDARIES OF UNION LIABILITY UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT

Enacted by Congress in 1890, the Sherman Antitrust Act' declared illegal "every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several states. . . ."' The courts lost no time in applying section
1 of the act to labor union activity. The Supreme Court, in the
3
famous Danbury Hatters
case in 1908, held that labor unions enjoy

no blanket immunity from the Sherman Act. In that case the United
Hatters Union of North America combined with the American
Federation of Labor to force all fur manufacturers to unionize their
shops by boycotting the manufacturer's hats and the businesses of
those who dealt with them as wholesalers or retailers. The Court
affirmed a treble damage4 judgment against members of the Hatters
Union, holding that the combination was in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several states within the meaning of the Sherman Act.
Two other statutory provisions, the Clayton Act' of 1914 and the
Norris-LaGuardia Act 6 of 1932, granted labor unions partial immunity from antitrust prosecution. The Clayton Act contained provisions apparently designed to forbid antitrust attack upon the normal
functioning of labor unions in pursuit of their legitimate objectives.7
126 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 69 Stat. 282, 15 U.S.C. 55 1-7 (1964).
226 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 69 Stat.282, 15 U.S.C. 5 1 (1964).
3Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908), further proceedings, Lawlor v. Loewe, 235
U.S. 522 (1915).
4 Violations of the Sherman Act arerestrained or redressed by injunction, criminal prosecution and (since the Clayton Act) civilaction for treble damages. 26 Star. 209 (1890), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-4 (1964), 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
538 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964), 38 Star. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. § 52
(1964).
647 Stat. 70

(1932), 29 U.S.C. 55 101-15 (1964).
Section 6 of the Clayton Act states:
"The labor of a human being isnot a commodity
or article
of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shallbe construed to forbid
the existence and operation of labor . . . organizations . . . or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof.
...(Emphasis added.) 38 Stat.731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. 5 17 (1964). Section 20
provides that "no restraining order or injunction shallbe granted by any court of the United
States, or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case between an employer and employees, or
between employees, or between persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving,
or growing out of, a dispute concerning the terms or conditions of employment ..
"
unless certain procedural requirements are met. Even after these requirements are met, the
injunction or restraining order is not to prohibit any person or persons, whether singly or in
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The Norris-LaGuardia Act, in more express terms, exempted from
injunction under the Sherman Act peaceful activities of striking,
picketing, and primary and secondary boycott where carried on in a
"labor dispute."' Section 13 (c) of the act defined a labor dispute
as "any controversy concerning terms and conditions of employment ....

It was not until the early 1940's that labor's exemption from antitrust laws began to take on definable judicial boundaries. In 1940
0 held that the
the Supreme Court in United States v. Hutcheson"
Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts must be considered in pari
materia as having amended the Sherman Act by removing from its
scope the activity defined in Norris-LaGuardia as a "labor dispute."'
In effect, the Hutcheson decision gave unions a free hand to effect
concert, from terminating any relation of employment, or from ceasing to perform any
work or labor, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful means so
to do; or from attending at any place where any such person or persons may lawfully be,
for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or from peacefully
persuading any person to work or abstain from working; or from ceasing to patronize or to
employ any party to such dispute, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by
peaceful and lawful means to so do "nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph
be considered or held to be violations of any law of the United States." 38 Stat. 738 (1914),
29 U.S.C. § 52 (1964).
'Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides that
No Court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing
out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or
interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing,
whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation
of employment.
(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization or of any
employer organization regardless of any such undertaking or promise
as is described in section 103 of this title;
(c) Paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person participating or
interested in such labor dispute, any strike or unemployment benefits
or insurance, or other moneys or things of value;
(d) By all lawful means aiding any person participating or interested in any
labor dispute who is being proceeded against in, or is prosecuting, any
action or suit in any court of the United States or of any State;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor
dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other
method not involving fraud or violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their
interests in a labor dispute;
(g) Advising or notifying any person of an intention to do any of the acts
heretofore specified;
(h) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the acts heretofore specified; and
(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or
violence the acts heretofore specified, regardless of any such undertaking or promise as isdescribed in section 103 of this title. 47 Stat. 70
(1932), 29 U.S.C. S 104 (1964).
947 Stat.70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. S 113(c) (1964).
'0312 U.S. 219 (1941).

'lid,at 235-36.
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legitimate labor objectives by peaceful means.'" The Court in Hutcheson, however, qualified labor's freedom from the Sherman Act by
requiring that the unions act in their own self-interest and not in
combination with non-labor groups."
In 1945, four years after Hutcheson, the Court further delineated

the boundaries in Allen-Bradley Co. v. Electrical Workers Union,
Local 3.1' That case involved a collective bargaining agreement be-

tween the union and a group of employers in a scheme to monopolize
a local market by boycotting out-of-city and non-union goods. The
Court held that the union had violated the Sherman Act even though
the restraint of trade was the result of a contract formulated in the
interests of the union. The Court reiterated the qualifying expression

in Hutcheson's and held that:
When the union participated with a combination of business men who
had complete power to eliminate all competition among themselves and
to prevent all competition from others, a situation was created not
included within the exemptions of the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia
Acts.'

Essential to the Allen-Bradley holding was the unlawful combination of employees and employers. The difficulty lies in determining
what constitutes such a combination. It has been held that a union
retains its immunity from the Sherman Act when it combines with
a non-labor group to achieve an end beneficial to, or involving the
interests of, only the union." Later cases, however, have interpreted
Allen-Bradley to mean that antitrust immunity is lost when the
" Though the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibited the use of injunctions "in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute," it apparently did not legalize the union activity originally covered by § 20 of the Clayton Act, for the final "catch all" clause of that
section was not repeated in the new act. However, the Court in Hutcheson decided that
passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act had accomplished just such a broad legalizing of union
conduct within the scope of § 20. See GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAw 273-77 (2d ed.

1958).

1,"So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor
groups, the licit and the illicit . . . are not to be distinguished by any judgment regarding
the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfish or unselfish of the end of
which the particular activities are the means." United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219,

232 (1941).
14 325 U.S. 797 (1945),

later proceedings, 164 F.2d 71 (1947).
"5See note 13 supra.
16Allen-Bradley v. Electrical Workers Union, Local 3, 325 U.S. 797, 809 (1945);
Pennington,
381 U.S. 657 (1965).
1
See Davis Pleating & Button Co. v. California Sportswear & Dress Ass'n, 145 F. Supp.
864 (S.D. Cal. 1956); United States v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 47 F. Supp. 304 (N.D.
Ill.1942), aff'd per curiam, 318 U.S. 741 (1943). See alsoWinter, Collective Bargaining
and Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J.
14 (1963).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19

employer-union combination exists coupled with an anticompetitive
intent on the part of either the employers or the union."
From the above background it appears that labor is exempt from
antitrust attack as long as the activity falls within the "labor dispute"" category of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Even though a labor
dispute is present, however, the exemption is lost when such dispute
is effected by the requisite union-employer conspiracy coupled with
an anticompetitive intent. The National Labor Relations Act," section 8 (d), requires the employer and the union to bargain collectively concerning the subjects of wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment; according to the Norris-LaGuardia Act
any controversy over these subjects is a "labor dispute" and exempt
from antitrust attack."' This leads to the apparent conclusion that
any management-union controversy over activities concerning wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment are exempt
from antitrust attack; a fortiori all controversies concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining-absent an Allen-Bradley combinationare exempt from the anti-trust laws.
The present status of this seemingly logical conclusion is the consumation of a building-block endeavor on an ad hoc basis. 2 This fact
alone stresses the significance and impact of each new decision concerning labor's immunity from or susceptibility to antitrust actions
under the Sherman Act. Just what topics are mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining, just what activity evidences an illegal management-union combination, and what other possible labor activities
might fall within the ambit of antitrust attack are the problems
before the courts today. These problems were recently faced in two
United States Supreme Court cases: United Mine Workers v. Pen"See Electrical Workers Union, Local 175 v. United States, 219 F.2d 431 (6th Cir.
1955) (per curiam), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 917 (1955); Philadelphia Record Co. v. Manufacturing Photo-Engravers Ass'n, 155 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1946); United States v. Milk
Drivers Union, 153 F. Supp. 803 (D .Minn. 1957).
"9See text accompanying note 10 supra.
2049 Star. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151-68 (1964).
21 See note 13 supra.
" For a detailed review and analytical history of antitrust application to labor unions
since the passage of the Sherman Act, see Barnes, Goldberg & Miller, Unions and the Antitrust Laws, 7 LAB. L.J. 133, 178, 186 (1956); Bernhardt, The Allen-Bradley Doctrine:
An Accommodation of Conflicting Policies, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1094 (1962); Clark,
Application of the Sherman Antitrust Act to Unions Since the Apex Case, 2 Sw. L.J. 94
(1948); Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA. L.
REv. 252, 264-65 (1955); Gregory, The Sherman Act v. Labor, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 222
(1941); Schmidt, The Application of the Antitrust Laws to Labor: A New Era, 19 Texas
L. REv. 256 (1941); Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of
Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14 (1963).
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nington5 and Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen,
Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co.'
II.

UNITED MINE WORKERS V. PENNINGTON

The Pennington case involved a collective bargaining agreement
between the United Mine Workers Union and the nation's major coal
producers on a "wage equalization" program. Both the union and
the large coal companies recognized that a major problem of the
industry was overcapacity resulting from the large number of mines.
To alleviate the problem, they agreed upon a wage level which was
expected to drive the marginal coal producers out of business. The
small, unautomated firms would bear a larger relative burden of the
increased wage costs which they could not afford.
One of the small coal companies" alleged that the union had conspired with the major companies to drive smaller operators out of the
industry, and that this conspiracy violated the Sherman Act.2" The
Supreme Court concluded that the collective agreement between
UMW and the large operators to secure the uniform wage scheme
throughout the industry, if proved, was not exempt from the antitrust laws: "One group of employers may not conspire to eliminate
competitors from the industry and a union is equally liable if it
becomes a party to the conspiracy."" Notwithstanding the conspiracy
issue, the Court, on narrower procedural grounds, reversed the lower
court ruling against the union and remanded the proceedings."
At first glance, the Pennington decision appears to be a clear reaffirmation of Allen-Bradley. However, the Court went a step beyond Allen-Bradley and applied the Sherman Act to what it labeled
a "more basic defect" from the standpoint of antitrust policy." In
Allen-Bradley, the conspiracy between the union and the employers
was for the purpose of excluding competition from out-of-state
23381 U.S. 657 (1965).

24381 U.S. 676 (1965).
' For a detailed and analytical history of the factual aspects of the Pennington case, see
Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to
Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14, 51-53 (1963).
2626 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1964). See text accompanying
note 2 supra.
27381 U.S. 657, 665-66 (1965).
2' The Court reversed the holding and remanded the case for a new trial because it
found that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence concerning the efforts of the UMW
and the companies to nersuade the Secretary of Labor to set a high Walsh-Healey minimum
wage and then instructed the jury that it could include damages resulting from this action
in its verdict. Thus, joint efforts by a group of employers and a union to influence public
officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition.
Such conduct is not illegal, either standing alone or as part of a broader scheme that itself
violates the Sherman Act.
29381 U.S. 657, 668 (1965).
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employers (manufacturers). The union had no membership connection with the out-of-state employers and would benefit only
through the monopolistic advantage of its own employers. In Pennington, however, the union bound itself to the policy of one group
of employers in an industry wide bargaining unit to impose the same
contract terms on the remaining employers of union members in
the bargaining unit. The union thereby surrendered its freedom of
action with respect to its bargaining policy. This inflexibility in the
union's power to bargain was the "more basic defect" announced by
the Court:
Prior to the agreement the union might seek uniform standards in its
own self-interest but would be required to assess in each case the probable costs and gains of a strike or other collective action to that end and
thus might conclude that the objective of uniform standards should
temporarily give way. After the agreement the union's interest would
be bound in each case to that of the favored employer group. It is just
such restraints upon the freedom of economic units to act according
to their own choice and discretion that run counter to antitrust policy."'
Thus, when the unions bind themselves to a favored employer
group and attempt to impose the same contract terms on the remaining employers in the bargaining unit, the antitrust laws are violated.
The inflexibility in the union's freedom to bargain is a more basic
violation of antitrust principles than the general combination-anticompetitive intent requisite of the Allen-Bradley situation. But as
in Allen-Bradley, the fact that the agreement concerns mandatory
subjects of collective bargaining does not of itself prevent successful
antitrust attack.
III.

AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS AND BUTCHER WORKMEN,

LOCAL 189 V. JEWEL TEA CO.

In the Jewel Tea case the meat cutters' local unions in the Chicago
area and an association of independent retail grocers (Associated)

had operated for many years under collective bargaining agreements
which prohibited the sale of meat during evening hours. Jewel Tea
Co., a large chain of retail grocery stores, consistently joined in these
agreements. In 1957, however, both Jewel Tea Co. and Associated
supported an all-employer proposal to allow evening sales. The
unions rejected the proposals and authorized a strike, if necessary,
to avoid night work. Associated surrendered to the union demands
and signed the agreement restricting night sales. Finally, Jewel Tea
also submitted to the agreement under duress of the threatened
so Ibid.
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strike, but later brought suit against the union and Associated. Jewel
alleged that the union had violated the federal antitrust laws by conspiring with Associated with intent to eliminate marketing hours as
an area of employer competition. Jewel complained that the members
of Associated had agreed among themselves to insist that all collective bargaining agreements negotiated with the defendant unions
should prohibit the sale of meat before 9 a.m. and after 6 p.m., that
the union locals conspired with Associated by refusing to allow union
members to sell such meat at any time outside those hours, and that
the unions had acted as enforcing agents of the conspiracy.
At the close of the evidence, the district court3 ' dismissed the complaint and found that the record was devoid of any evidence to support a finding of a conspiracy" between Associated and the unions
to force the restrictive provision on Jewel. The court of appeals'
reversed the district court and held that a union loses its exemption
from the Sherman Act when it negotiates a collective bargaining
agreement which invades the proprietary function of setting marketing hours. The court held that the limitation upon marketing hours
in and of itself established evidence of an illicit management-union
combination-"the rest of the industry agreed with the defendant
local union to infringe upon the rights and prerogatives of the
employer."
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held, without a majority," that the market hour restriction in the agreement
was within the scope of the labor exemption from antitrust attack,
proceeding on the theory that the issue presented was not the alleged
union-employer conspiracy against Jewel. The Court narrowed the
issue to the question of the subject matter of the agreement itself, i.e.,
whether the market hours restriction was immune from attack.
[T]he issue before us is not the broad substantive one of a violation
which unreasonably restrained trade or an attempt to monopolize and
was Jewel damaged in its business-but whether the agreement is immune from attack by reason of the labor exemption from the antitrust laws.'
" Jewel Tea Co. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen, 215 F. Supp.
837 (N.D. Ill.
1962).
82 Id. at 848.
" Jewel Tea Co. v. Associated Food Retailers of Greater Chicago, Inc., 331 F.2d 547

(7th34 Cir. 1964).
1d. at 551.
'The

judgment was announced in an opinion by Mr. Justice White in which Chief

Justice Warren and Justice Brennan joined. Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black
and Clark dissented in favor of the Allen-Bradley conspiracy doctrine. Mr. Justice Goldberg
joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart concurred in the result of White's opinion but presented a lengthy opinion that the Sherman Act has no application to union activity.
as381 U.S. 676, 688-89 (1965).
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Thus proceeding, the Court said that the particular hours of the day
and the particular days of the week during which employees shall
be required to work are subjects well within the realm of "wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" about
which employers and unions must bargain. And, under the NorrisLaGuardia definition, any controversy arising from these subjects,
absent evidence of an illicit combination, is a "labor dispute" and
exempt from antitrust attack. 7
The Jewel Tea decision appears to flow directly from the Hutcheson
holding that a union acting as a union, in the interests of its members, and not acting to fix prices or allocate markets in conspiracy
with an employer is not subject to challenge under antitrust laws.
Accordingly, joint negotiations and uniform collective bargaining

do not of themselves evidence illegal management-union combinations
as are violative of antitrust laws.38 The Jewel Tea decision leaves the
union free to bargain and strike for legitimate labor objectives so long
as it acts independently of a non-labor group. Any controversy that
arises over market operating hours would clearly be a labor dispute
within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.3'
It is significant in itself that the Court found marketing hours,
like working hours, to constitute a subject of such immediate and

legitimate concern to union members to thus be a mandatory subject
of bargaining. The chance that such an agreement may result in

restraint of trade or competition does not of itself subject unions to
prosecution under the antitrust laws."0
It is also interesting to note that the union-employer agreement in
Jewel Tea approaches but does not fall within the "basic defect"
criteria of Pennington. The union in Jewel Tea obtained the terms
it desired from the retailers' association and then sought the same
terms from Jewel Tea Co. However, the union in Jewel Tea did not
absolutely bind itself to Associated to impose the same terms of Jewel.
After the union had dealt with Associated, it might have submitted
to Jewel's proposals for night sales, but assessing the probable costs
of a strike or other collective action, it freely chose to strike. The
union retained its freedom to bargain with Jewel in any way it de7

United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
" See Adams Dairy Co. v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 260 F.2d 46, 49 (8th Cir. 1958);
Meier & Pohlman Furniture Co. v. Gibbons, 233 F.2d 296, 302 (8th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 879 (1956); Rossi v. McCloskey & Co., 149 F. Supp. 638, 640 (E.D. Pa. 1957);
Cox, Labor and The Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 252, 271
(1955).
as See Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 362 U.S. 330 (1960); Aetna
Freight Lines, Inc. v. Clayton, 228 F.2d 384, 386-87 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 950 (1956).
43 381 U.S. 676, 692 (1965).
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sired. It is precisely this freedom of choice that the union retained
in its bargaining activity-the freedom the union did not enjoy in
Pennington-that exempted it from successful antitrust attack.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Court in Pennington found that the management-union com-

bination sufficiently evidenced a violation of the Sherman Act according to the Allen-Bradley decision. However, the Court discovered
that apart from and beyond the Allen-Bradley doctrine there existed
a more fundamental violation of antitrust laws. Pennington seems to
have extended the Allen-Bradley combination-anticompetitive intent
theory of antitrust violation. When a union binds its interests to a
favored employer group in a multi-employer bargaining unit, there
exists a "basic defect" from the viewpoint of antitrust principles. It
is the restraint upon the freedom of the union to act according to its
own choice and discretion that runs counter to antitrust policy.
Thus, even in management-union negotiations over mandatory
subjects of bargaining, (wages in Pennington) if the union obligates
itself unconditionally to impose the same terms agreed upon with
the favored employer on other employers in the bargaining unit, the
antitrust laws are violated. This implies that to warrant antitrust
attack there need not necessarily be extrinsic evidence of an illicit
combination with anticompetitive motives on the part of either the
union or the employer. The restraint upon the union's power to
bargain is enough.
In Jewel Tea, by classifying market operating hours as a proper
subject of mandatory collective bargaining, the Court declared such
a restriction exempt from antitrust attack absent an Allen-Bradley
or Pennington violation. The limitation upon marketing hours in a
collective bargaining agreement, being the consummation of arm's
length negotiations, did not of itself establish an illicit managementunion combination. It thus appears that when a union agrees with
one set of employers in a multi-bargaining unit as to when, as distinguished from how long, employees must work, the union is pursuing a legitimate labor objective even though the agreement may
result in forfeiting the element of marketing hours as a competitive
tool among employers.
The controversies in Pennington and Jewel Tea furnish fresh and
contemporary evidence of the traditional ad hoc approach that leaves
management and labor in a state of uncertainty in trying to ascertain
their legal obligations under the antitrust laws. The formulation of
any rule of thumb which would harmonize the policies of the labor

